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Abstract 
This article argues that the manner in which the Security Council inhibits the consistent 
application of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and International Criminal Court (ICC) 
referrals reinforces their power in the international order without creating long term peace 
and stability. The Security Council’s discretionary powers allow it to subjectively determine 
which situations to address and which lawbreakers to prosecute; this consolidates, and indeed 
expands, the power of the Security Council in relation to other agents of international law. As 
a result, international cooperation to protect and promote human rights and punish human 
rights violators is currently impeded. This article argues that those concerned with the 
consistent enforcement of international human rights law, and the punishment of human 
rights violators, must accept the need for reforms to the current international order that would 
allow a better integration of R2P and the ICC into international law and practice. Our reforms 
– advanced in the form of general principles taken from legal theory – propose altering the 
Security Council’s powers and developing new judicial structures to enable the more 
consistent application of international law. 
 
Introduction 
In the mythology of the old west, the sheriff made judgments and executed punishments. His 
image in popular culture (or, more accurately, American political culture) was of a lone hero 
standing up to criminals without the backing of a fully defined legal order. But there are two 
central problems with the sheriff. First, while his role is legally authorized, the sheriff’s 
selection of which criminals to pursue and what punishment to inflict is purely discretionary. 
As a result, law enforcement reflects his personal and professional interests.  Second, he 
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conflates in one person the three different functions of law in a political order: legislation, 
judgment and enforcement. While he might have the legal ‘right’ in one sense - or might see 
himself as being morally right - to act, in so doing he will increase his own power at the 
expense of other agents in the community.  
International relations has long had self-appointed guardians of law and order – most 
obviously (and literally) in the case of the George W. Bush era US – who, impatient with the 
procedural delays that come with formal legal methods, see themselves standing sheriff-like 
before the onslaught of evil.1 When emergency situations arise – either terrorists or war 
criminals – someone ostensibly needs to act to stop them. A sheriff differs from a vigilante, 
though, in that the former is an official authorized by the state while the latter is an individual 
acting purely in his or her own interests. The vigilante may be acting in accordance with a 
shared normative sensibility about who deserves punishment, but that is not an officially 
sanctioned role. The sheriff, however, is officially sanctioned and may act in conformity with 
shared normative and legal principles. At the same time, the sheriff consolidates his power 
with each enforcement action and remains outside of any institutional check or judicial 
review in his decision on how to, or what to, enforce when it comes to transgressions of the 
law.2 Thus, a sheriff’s actions may be formally legal but they remain disconnected from 
justice and, as a result, potentially illegitimate.3  
Our contention in this article is that humanitarian intervention and the punishment of 
human rights violators in the current international order is being framed in such a way that it 
 
1 See, C.S, Gray, The Sheriff: America’s Defense of the New World Order (Lexington KY: The University Press 
of Kentucky, 2004). 
2 See N. Wheeler, ‘Reflections on the Legality and Legitimacy of NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo’ in K. Booth, 
(ed), The Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimension (New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001) 146-163 
3 We acknowledge, of course, that in some contexts, sheriffs undertook their duties in conformity with the rule 
of law, such as seeking warrants for arrest and ensuring they did not expand their institutional power. The 
physical location of the sheriff, cut off from any other legal institutions, meant that in almost all cases his 
actions would result in his power being increased in relation to those he governed. Further, we recognize that the 
term sheriff derives from older sources in English law where it had a different institutional relationship to the 
orders of law.  
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consolidates the position of sheriffs rather than strengthening judges (a metaphor for a 
stronger legal order). We focus on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) as evidence of the framework being consolidated that enables the 
selective and arbitrary use both of military force and punitive censure rather than 
strengthening the formal procedures of a normative legal order. We argue that the efficacy of 
both R2P and the ICC remains compromised by the powers vested in the UN Security 
Council (UNSC) and point to examples from the Arab Spring to illustrate these claims. We 
argue, that so long as the international legal order remains unchanged, we cannot expect R2P 
or the ICC to operate in a manner consistent with normatively sound principles of legal 
theory.  
This paper suggests the contours of a reformed international legal order that might 
better function to protect populations and individuals without creating the problem of the 
sheriff. It does so not by abandoning law enforcement and punishment, but rather by more 
clearly articulating how they must be connected to a legal and political order in which law 
making and law enforcement are clearly defined. Our approach advocates a more explicit 
constitutional order, one in which the powers and practices of law making are separated from 
law enforcement and which includes a more purposeful law making, or legislative, function 
within which norms such as R2P can be translated into rules or even laws. In so doing, we 
circumvent the idea that making R2P a legal obligation is too difficult, for it both 
incorporates existing legal principles and also can be made a more robust legal instrument if 
it arises from a clearly defined law making structure.  
In the first section, we briefly review the powers of the UNSC as an institution with 
‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’. We then turn 
to the nature of law enforcement and punishment in international relations, with a special 
focus on the use of force. The next section looks at the manner in which the powers of the 
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UNSC contrive to inhibit the consistent application of both R2P and the ICC. After exploring 
these theoretical points, we turn to instances arising from the Arab Uprisings as evidence of 
this selectivity and punitive elements of the international response. We conclude with general 
suggestions on the contours of the reforms we feel are required.  
The Security Council 
The unrivalled power of the UNSC derives from the privileged position given to the five 
permanent members. Their position reflects their power at the founding of the organization, 
power levels that continue to be constituted by their military and economic might in the 
current international order (perhaps more so for some of the five than others).4  
As noted in our introduction the UNSC has substantially increased its authority in the 
international order. This increased authority is seen by some as a positive development, but 
we see its increasing authority as more problematic. To understand why this is the case, it is 
useful to briefly review the legal powers of the UNSC according to the UN Charter. The 
powers and functions of the UNSC are laid out in Article 24 of the UN Charter which confers 
on the UNSC ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security’. It then goes on to note that more specific powers are enumerated in Chapters VI, 
VII, VIII and XII of the Charter. But all these powers relate back to this primary 
responsibility, one that is conferred on the UNSC by the member states of the UN.   
The word ‘primary’ suggests that while the UNSC may have most of the 
responsibility for peace and security, it is not the only organ even within the UN system to 
have this responsibility.  Both the General Assembly and the International Court of Justice 
 
4 D. Bosco, Five to Rule Them All: The United Nations Security Council and the Making of the Modern World  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 
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(ICJ) also have responsibilities in this area, and, as noted by Anne Peters, ‘the different 
organs must observe the institutional balance and pay each other mutual due respect’.5  
 In addition, within the international or global constitutional order the UNSC might be 
seem to be an ‘executive’ body in accordance with the traditional division of powers in a 
legal system; yet, there is nothing in the Charter which labels the UNSC an executive. If 
considered in a constitutional sense, the Charter is clear that the UNSC must report to the 
General Assembly, a seemingly innocuous provision but one that has, in fact, important 
constitutional implications. The provision that the UNSC issue regular reports to the General 
Assembly was inserted by the smaller states who wished to ensure that the Council 
understood its role as ‘a trustee of the membership (or of the international community) 
institutionalized in the General Assembly, which must render its ‘accounts’ to the trust 
givers’.6 This suggests that the UNSC was designed to be constrained in some broad sense by 
its institutional relationship to the General Assembly. Further, while the UNSC is not 
formally subject to judicial review by the ICJ or any other organ, the 2008 Kadi decision by 
the European Court of Justice points to the importance of judicial review in order to ensure 
the UNSC adheres to its responsibilities.7 There are, of course, numerous legal and political 
complexities of this case, but it provides one instance of how the UNSC was somehow 
subject to review by a judicial body.  
 The Charter alone does not determine the role of the UNSC; as with any ‘living’ 
constitution, the international political and legal order is shaped by the practices of those who 
compose it. In the case of the UNSC, its practices have evolved as a result of various political 
realities, primarily the Cold War. Since the end of the Cold War, the UNSC has become 
 
5 A. Peters ‘Article 24’ in Bruno Simma, et al., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3rd edition, 
Volume I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012): 767. 
6 Ibid, 777. 
7 There are numerous discussions of the Kadi Case in law and politics. A good introduction to some of the key 
issues can be found in: R Wesssel, ‘The Kadi Case: Towards a More Substantive Hierarchy in International 
Law’ [2008] International Organization Law Review 5, 323-327 
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active across a range of issues and conflicts. This activity can be interpreted in numerous 
ways; for some it represents the achievement of the UNSC’s responsibilities in the 
international order, while for others it constitutes a form of global ‘mission creep’ in which 
the UNSC has increased its powers to the detriment of other agents. 8 The authority of the 
UNSC also relates to the power and legitimacy of those states that compose it, particularly 
the P5. For some theorists, the UNSC’s authority relies on the fact that it is controlled by 
these powers, who they claim have a kind of de facto authority for governing the international 
order.9 Others argue that the P5’s powers actually undermine the authority of the UNSC by 
delegitimizing its mandate and practice, a position often linked to calls for reform of the 
UNSC.10 
 The emergence of new institutions in the international order can both challenge and 
reinforce the authority of institutions such as the UNSC. For instance, the ICC now shares the 
responsibility for creating peace and security in the international political and legal order. The 
ICC’s legitimacy does not rely on the UNSC as the war crimes tribunals in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda did, as they were created by UNSC resolutions. Instead, the ICC 
arose from a treaty giving it a firm foundation in the international legal order. But, there are 
links between the two institutions which derive in part from their responsibility for 
maintaining international peace and security. Articles 13 and 16 of the Rome Statute create 
the link between the two; Article 13 allows the UNSC to refer cases to the ICC, while Article 
16 allows the UNSC to defer the pursuit of a case or situation in order to allow other 
 
8 T. Fraser and V. Popovski, (eds), The Security Council as Global Legislator (London: Routledge, 2014) 
9 See for instance, D. Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009) who 
argues that the US has legitimate international authority because of its provision of public goods in the 
international system. G. J. Ikenberry makes a related point, arguing that the US has played a key role in 
advancing a liberal world order and so should be considered authoritative in some broad sense at the global 
level; G. Ikenberry, Liberal Order and Imperial Ambition: Essays on American Power and International Order 
(London: Polity Press, 2006). 
10 M. Imber, UN Security Council Reform: ‘From Here to Eternity?’ (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2006) 
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mechanisms of peace-making to be pursued. The two institutions have seen a range of 
interactions, some of which we describe below. 
  
Embedded Selectivity: R2P and the ICC 
The international legal and political order is constituted by rules which arise from both formal 
processes (e.g., treaties) and informal understandings (e.g., diplomatic practice). In order for 
the system to function, however, these rules need enforcement. Importantly, the enforcement 
of the law and the punishment of those who violate it is not simply about those individual 
instances; over time, practices of enforcement and punishment shape the wider legal and 
political order. It is our contention that while the international legal and political order does 
indeed reveal moments of law enforcement and punishment the present conflation of 
institutional responsibilities, which is actually further enabled by the discourse of R2P, is 
consolidating an unjust political and legal order. The argument we make here, therefore, is 
directed toward how a revised international legal and political order might both ensure the 
protection of individuals and also create a more just political and legal order.  
Debates have long raged on whether international law is actually law. The crux of 
these debates for the purposes of this paper is not really the question of whether international 
law exists but rather whether it works. There are myriad international laws on a vast array of 
subjects; indeed, such is its scope, life as we know it would be impossible without 
international law. Yet, international law is primarily judged on its efficacy in two particular 
areas; the use of force and the protection of human rights. While the routine adherence to the 
majority of international laws goes unremarked, the occasional and “spectacular” violations 
of international law in these areas generate outrage. The 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 
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murderous campaign waged since 2011 by President Assad, for example, naturally lead 
people to wonder “where is international law?”  
 The existence of a body mandated to enforce law – by both judging that a law has 
been violated and determining the nature of the requisite punishment for this infraction – is 
essential for any legal system. Of profound importance for the functioning of this body, and 
indeed the legal system over which it presides, is its legitimacy which is dependent upon its 
perceived impartiality and record of practice.11 
At present the international body serving this function is the UNSC; as we discuss 
later this is fundamentally problematic because the UNSC does not constitute an impartial 
judicial body. Though mandated to act on behalf of the international community of states, the 
UNSC is very obviously a body of states with particular national interests which have often 
inhibited the enforcement of the very international laws the body is charged with enforcing.  
If the enforcement of law – domestic or international – is evidently a function of 
political interest then this has grave consequences not just for the legal system, but for order 
amongst the subjects of this system. Arbitrary and politicised law enforcement breeds 
contempt for the legal system amongst its subjects who are naturally inclined to determine 
that their safety and survival is dependent on their own initiative rather than the higher 
authority to which they are formally bound. By opting out of the legal system – formally or 
not – states may certainly have more formal freedom but in practice this freedom will be 
repeatedly violated by other free-riders thus precipitating a world order that is ‘chaotic and 
incomprehensible’.12 Therefore, as Hans Kelsen noted the manner in which law is enforced is 
 
11 See R. Falk, M. Juergensmeyer, and V. Popovski, (eds), Legality and Legitimacy in Global Affairs (Oxford; 
Oxford University Press, 2012) 
12 M. Koskenniemi ‘What is International Law For?’ in M. Evans (ed.) International Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 69 
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‘the essential stage in any legal procedure’ and of paramount importance to the health and 
efficacy of the legal regime, especially at the international level; 
As long as it is not possible to remove from the interested states the prerogative to 
answer the question of law and transfer it once and for all to an impartial authority, 
namely, an international court, any further progress on the way to the pacification of 
the world is absolutely excluded.13  
While Kelsen – and indeed many others – reflected on the manner in which international law 
was enforced in a number of key areas, our focus here is on the enforcement of international 
law with respects to human rights.  
In the contemporary era, R2P and the ICC have become the two most prominent 
institutions of international human rights enforcement.  R2P seeks to prevent and, more 
controversially, halt human rights violations while the ICC is orientated towards punishing 
those who violate human rights. Therefore, while R2P and the ICC deal with different legal 
areas – with the former orientated towards emergency response and the latter retrospective 
punishment – both share a number of commonalities. Most obviously both deal with 
egregious human rights violations; R2P’s remit is the “four crimes” outlined in Paragraph 
138 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, namely genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity, while the ICC is mandated to try those accused of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.14 Secondly, both relate to “law 
enforcement”; R2P is analogous to the emergency response provisions within domestic legal 
systems – such as most obviously the role of the police – while the ICC clearly parallels the 
 
13 H. Kelsen, Peace Through Law (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 13 
14 The ICC is also tasked with prosecuting violations of the law of aggression, but this remains a controversial 
crime.  The ICC has sought to give more precision to the definition of the crime of aggression in its 2010 
Review conference, but it is unlikely that individuals will be brought before the Court for this crime in the near 
future. Moreover, because of its contested status, it tends not to be seen as part of the international legal 
framework in which human rights and international criminal law intersect. Hence, it is largely outside of the 
concerns of our analysis here.  
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role played by domestic courts. This is not to suggest, of course, that the international legal 
order is comparable with any existing domestic legal order; rather the point is that a 
normative legal order – domestic or international – would comprise both an emergency 
response component and a judicial punishment process as part of the means by which the 
laws are enforced. Finally, the efficacy of both is essentially dependent upon the same body; 
the UNSC. As we discuss below, the manner in which R2P and the ICC are operationalized 
depends upon the acquiescence of the UNSC, and more specifically, the P5.  
 
Law Enforcement, Punishment and R2P 
In 2005 two paragraphs of the World Summit Outcome Document made reference to R2P; in 
essence, they stated that individual states had certain responsibilities towards their own 
citizens and also that the international community had a concomitant responsibility to act if 
the host state was unable or unwilling to abide by this responsibility. While this commitment 
was certainly laudable, it is hardly new.15 Each of the "four crimes" was illegal long before 
2005; indeed, there is no shortage of international laws proscribing human rights abuses.16 
Likewise, that the international community had the right to intervene in the domestic affairs 
of states to prevent and/or halt these crimes was also established - and indeed actualised - 
before 2005.17 Of course, as is well known the enforcement of international human rights law 
has been erratic; indeed it was this inconsistency that the ICISS explicitly sought to address.  
 
15 C. Bassiouni, ‘Advancing the Responsibility to Protect Through International Criminal Justice’, in R.H. 
Cooper and J.V. Kohler (eds) Responsibility to Protect: The Global Moral Compact for the 21st Century 
(Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); A. Peters, ‘Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty’, [2009] The 
European Journal of International Law, 20, 513; C. Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or 
Emerging Legal Norm?’ [2007] American Journal of International Law, 101, 99; T. Reinhold, ‘The 
Responsibility to Protect: Much Ado About Nothing?’ [2010] Review of International Studies, 36, 55 
16 T. Landman, Studying Human Rights (London: Routledge, 2005), 14 
17 S. Chesterman, ‘“Leading from Behind”: The Responsibility to Protect, the Obama Doctrine, and 
Humanitarian Intervention after Libya’, [2011] Ethics and International Affairs, 25,  1; A. Hehir ‘Libya and The 
Responsibility to Protect: Resolution 1973 as Consistent with the Security Council’s Record of Inconsistency", 
[2013] International Security, 38, 137 
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 This inconsistency stems from the institutional structure of the UN and in particular 
the power - particularly the veto - wielded by the P5. The only viable legal basis for external 
intervention in the domestic affairs of a state - without the state's consent - is Chapter VII of 
the Charter which is dependent on the assent of the UNSC. Unsurprisingly then, the 
enforcement of international law - specifically the use of force for the protection of human 
rights - is prey to the political exigencies of the P5. The powers vested in the P5 were 
consciously designed so as to reflect the realities of power in international politics and 
orientate the organisation towards the maintenance of order rather than the pursuit of 
justice.18 R2P has not altered in any way the institutional arrangements for enforcing 
international law or the remit of the P5, nor has it created an alternative source of authority to 
the UNSC and, therefore, law enforcement remains dependant on the political will and 
national interests of the P5s.  
 The absence of legal reform is not seen, however, as problematic by many of R2P's 
advocates who argue that R2P is 'revolutionary' because it creates a framework for ostensibly 
irresistible moral advocacy.19 R2P has become, in essence, a means by which normative 
pressure is consolidated and political will mobilised so as to change the decision-making 
calculus of the P5.20  Legal reform is rejected by many as utopian; the ostensibly more 
 
18 M. Berdal, ‘The UN Security Council: Ineffective but Indispensable’, [2003] Survival, 45, 7; D. Bosco, Five 
to Rule Them All (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 10-38; D. Bourantonis, The History and Politics of 
Security Council Reform (London: Routledge, 2007), 6; N. White, ‘The Will and Authority of the Security 
Council After Iraq’, [2004] Leiden Journal of International Law, 17, 645; J. Mertus,  The United Nations and 
Human Rights (London: Routledge, 2009), 98; G. Simpson,  Great Powers and Outlaw States (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 68 
19 L. Feinstein, ‘Beyond Words: Building Will and Capacity to Prevent More Darfurs’, The Washington Post, 26 
January, 2007; D. Scheffer, ‘Atrocity Crimes: Framing the Responsibility to Protect’, in Cooper and Kohler (n 
15), 95 
20 International Coalition for RtoP, 'Founding Purposes of the Coalition', 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/about-coalition/founding-purposes; A. Bellamy, Responsibility 
to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (London: Polity, 2009), 119; G. Evans, The Responsibility 
to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 
2008), 223  
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realistic strategy is to craft arguments that will convince states to abide by their previous 
commitments to respect human rights.21  
 Thus, at present the existing mechanisms by which R2P is enforced remains a matter 
of political will which is by definition transitory and context-specific. While a case can be 
made that democratic states are somewhat receptive to moral advocacy - though this is far 
from assured as the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the non-intervention in Darfur attest22 - the 
willingness of China and Russia to accede to humanitarian appeals is surely negligible. As 
these states become increasingly more powerful, the efficacy of moral advocacy will 
arguably diminish.23  
R2P’s endorsement of the present system echoes, therefore, the powers vested in the 
sheriff as noted in the introduction where the legal authority to act is not accompanied by any 
duty; the UNSC may take action but it is under no obligation to do so and thus the P5 thus 
merely have a 'discretionary entitlement'.24 Thus, somewhat perversely, the centrality of 
UNSC authorisation in the application of R2P has in fact further consolidated the P5’s 
primacy, despite its powers actually constituting one of the original catalysts for the ICISS's 
proposal.  
Punitive practices play a role in the law enforcement process, but they also play a 
central role in creating political order. One can see this in the traditional liberal conception of 
a constitutional order in which the three parts of the political system – legislator, executive 
and judiciary – create rules and then enforce them. In this model, the legislative body makes 
the law, the judge determines if an individual had violated the law leading to the imposition 
of a sentence, and the executive carries out that sentence. Within that model, it might seem as 
 
21 Evans, (20), 137 
22 See, A. Hehir  Humanitarian Intervention After Kosovo (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 76-96 
23 A. Hehir and R.W. Murray ‘Intervention in the Emerging Multipolar System: Why R2P will Miss the 
Unipolar Moment’, [2012] Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 6, 387 
24 F. Berman,  ‘Moral Versus Legal Legitimacy’ in C. Reed and D. Ryall (eds.) The Price of Peace, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 161 
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if the legislator alone creates the order through the creation of rules that define it. But, the 
related judicial role of finding parties guilty and determining their sentence is also part of the 
creation of a just political order.25 The judgment of a judicial body regarding both how to 
interpret the law and the sanction applied when the law is violated plays a crucial role in the 
political order that emerges.  
A slightly different way to see this traditional constitutional division of labour can be 
found in an early essay by John Rawls where he argued that there are two types of rules: 
those that justify a practice as a whole and those that justify a particular application of that 
practice.  He uses this distinction to make the case that punishment can be justified in both 
utilitarian and retributive ways.  The practice of punishment as a means of enforcing justice 
in a society – that is, as an institution – is utilitarian.  But the particular application of 
punishment in specific cases – the action of punishment – is best understood as retributive.  
One way to see this distinction is through the different roles played by a legislator and a 
judge. The legislator constitutes the political through law making, with a focus on the good 
for the society as a whole. The judge, while seeing his or her role as ensuring that justice is 
done to this individual, also plays a role in constructing that larger order, although this might 
not be obvious at first.  In so doing, both look to the political community albeit, as Rawls 
notes, one toward its future and one towards its past.26 Punishment, as oriented toward 
violations taking place in the past, constructs the future of the political society.27 
 
25 These roles are simplified here, of course. The judicial body plays a central role in interpreting rules through 
its appellate function, in the US Supreme Court, or as a court of first instance, as in the German Constitutional 
Court. When it comes to sentencing, moreover, the roles of different institutions might vary across different 
contexts; for instance, sentencing from guidelines might come from the legislator, or perhaps from the 
executive. For a description of the relationship between sentencing and punishment, see S. Easton and C. Piper, 
Sentencing and Punishment: The Quest for Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 
26 J. Rawls, “Two Concepts of Rules” [1954] in H. B. Acton, ed, The Philosophy of Punishment: Collected 
Papers (London: Macmillian, 1969), 108 
27 An alternative conception of how punishment creates political and even social order can be found in Michel 
Foucault’s account of how punishment became discipline. Foucault’s assessment, while powerful and insightful, 
is less relevant for our purposes here, as we wish to propose alternative legal and political structures through 
which international punitive measures might be more just, something that Foucault would find more 
14 
 
If law enforcement includes both acts of protecting those whose rights are being 
violated in situations of conflict and the punishment of those doing the violating, a properly 
constituted legal order would be one in which these functions are undertaken by different 
institutions. In an ideal world, the UNSC should be engaged in duty-orientated practices that 
entail the protection dimension; i.e., halting violations taking place and enabling the capture 
or arrest of those engaged in those violations. But in order to protect the rights of the accused 
and, more importantly perhaps, to protect the wider international legal order, a different 
institution should be tasked with trying and sentencing – i.e., punishing – those who are 
found guilty of such violations. The roles of these two institutions should be somehow 
connected. But, the current connection between the institutions allows the UNSC to play an 
active role in the punitive process by giving it the ability to make choices about where the 
ICC should be active, and it gives the UNSC the ability to halt a prosecution that the ICC 
prosecutor or a state party wishes to pursue. The reason for the ability of the UNSC to play a 
role in the prosecutor’s decisions seems to rely on the assumption that only by co-opting the 
powerful would the ICC be able to function. The reason for the deferral role is to allow a 
peace process to be pursued without the interference of judicial activities. Yet, the decision to 
give the UNSC the power of deferral was a highly contested one at the Rome Conference. 
According to William Schabbas, the debate became in part about the powers of the P5 and 
their ability to control what should have been a completely independent judicial institution.28 
At this moment of creating the Court, many could already see the potential for the UNSC to 
politicize its activities. The deferral role has some political logic; there may indeed be times 
when the blind pursuit of justice will interfere with the possibility of political solutions. The 
 
problematic. See M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans by A. Sheridan (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1977). 




active prosecutorial role, however, seems less well grounded in long term political logic and 
seems only designed to appease the powerful states in order to allow the ICC to function. 
The emergence of R2P, however, has given the UNSC even more power to combine 
these roles than the ICC statute allow. As we will make clear below, because its normative 
agenda does not include any limits on the UNSC, and because the interventions that might be 
undertaken under the guise of R2P can quickly conflate protection and punishment – as was 
clearly the case with respects to Libya – the current formulation of the principle will 
(potentially) give even more power to the UNSC to override the institutional responsibilities 
of the ICC.  
R2P has rarely been defended as a punitive mode of intervention by any of its 
proponents. Yet, it is our contention that in order to ensure that states uphold their 
responsibilities to their own citizens, punitive measures are sometimes necessary. Moreover, 
the few times that R2P has been invoked by the Security Council or individual states in 
justifying a military action, a discourse of punishment has appeared. While interventions are 
not generally described as punitive – indeed, it is rare that punishment as a formal legal or 
even political concept is employed in international affairs – but a number of international 
political practices linked to R2P have strong punitive dimensions, the most obvious one being 
economic sanctions.29 Military intervention, even when labelled humanitarian, can also be 
punitive. Especially when interventions are undertaken in response to harms inflicted on a 
population and when the intended outcome is ‘bringing perpetrators to justice’ and/or 'regime 
change' rather than simply providing humanitarian aid, interventions look and sound more 
like punitive measures than purely humanitarian ones.30  
 
29See N. Onuf, Reprisals: Rituals, Rules, Rationales (Princeton: Centre for International Studies, 1974) 
30 For a definition of and empirical evidence for the existence of punitive intervention, see A.F Lang, Jr., 




The ICC, like any judicial body, has its own selectivity issues; cases will only be 
pursued when prosecutors, state parties, or the UNSC agree. But by giving the UNSC a role 
in deciding which cases to pursue, the power of the UNSC is further increased. R2P alone, of 
course, does not create this problem, for the P5 have their own reasons for seeking to increase 
their power in the international legal and political order. What we are arguing here is that 
R2P further increases the power of the UNSC by giving it the ability to punish in situations of 
conflict, a responsibility that is best left with the ICC where it can better conform to liberal 
norms of a fair trial. 
In what follows, we demonstrate how – through a focus on cases drawn from the Arab 
Uprisings – the use (and non-use) of R2P has contributed to a political and legal order that 
increases the power of the UNSC to the detriment of the wider international legal and 
political order.  
 
Arab Spring 
The UNSC's response to the crisis in Libya was unusually swift and characterised, at least 
initially, by unprecedented collective unity. While some criticised the intervention for a 
variety of reasons31, the focus here is not on the merits of the intervention itself but the means 
by which it was sanctioned and the broader context.  
 If China and/or Russia had chosen to veto Resolution 1973 the intervention would not 
have occurred; evidence suggests President Obama in particular considered UNSC approval 
to be Russia a sine qua non. What then explains the Chinese and Russian abstentions?  The 
most plausible explanation relates to the position adopted by the African Union (AU) and 
 
31 A. Kuperman  ‘NATO’s Intervention in Libya: A Humanitarian Success?’, in A. Hehir and R.W. Murray 
(eds) Libya, The Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention (Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013); C. McKinney  The Illegal War on Libya (Atlanta, GA: Clarity, 2012); M. Walzer, ‘The Case 
Against Our Attack on Libya’, The New Republic, 20 March, 2011.  
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especially the Arab League; neither China nor Russia wished to block an initiative which 
these regional organisations supported. This indeed, was reflected in the Chinese statement; 
‘We also attach great importance to the position of African countries and the AU. In view of 
this...China abstained.’32 Russia also explained its abstention was an expression of support for 
the Arab League's call for action.33 Indeed, according to Gareth Evans the Arab League's 
support ‘was absolutely crucial in ensuring that there was both a majority on the Council and 
no exercise of the veto by Russia or China’34 while one scholar stated, without its support, 
‘China and Russia would have certainly vetoed Resolution 1973.35 It is also clear that the 
US's position was greatly influenced by the AU's but most particularly the Arab League’s 
position.36  
The position of the Arab League - and the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) in particular - on the Arab Uprisings has been far from consistent37 and the reasoning 
behind their support for military action against Libya points towards obviously geopolitical 
motives.38 This inconsistency was most evident in Bahrain. While the Arab League’s 
statement on the 12th March championed the right of the Libyan people ‘to fulfil their 
demands and build their own future and institutions in a democratic framework’39 just two 
days later, acting through the GCC, Saudi Arabia and Qatar sent troops into Bahrain to help 
 
32 UNSC, Security Council 6498th Meeting, S/PV.6498, 17 March, 2011, 5. 
33 Ibid., 8. 
34 G. Evans, ‘The RtoP Balance Sheet After Libya’, September 2, 2011, 
http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech448%20interview%20RtoP.html, accessed 28 November 2011. 
35 A. Bellamy, ‘Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm’, [2011] Ethics and 
International Affairs, 25, 3.  
36 H. Clinton, ‘There’s “No Way” United States Will Take Unilateral Action in Libya’, CBS News, 16 March, 
2011, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20043991-503544.html, accessed 2 September 2012 
37 S. Colombo, ‘The GCC Countries and the Arab Spring’, in J. Davies (ed.) The Arab Spring and Arab Thaw, 
(Surrey; Ashgate, 2013) 
38 A. Bellamy and P. Williams, ‘The New Politics of Protection? Cote d’Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to 
Protect’, [2011] International Affairs, 82, 842. 
39 League of Arab States () The Outcome of the Council of the League of Arab States Meeting at the Ministerial 
Level in its Extraordinary Session on the Implications of the Current Events in Libya and the Arab Position, 
Cairo 12 March, 2012, 2,  
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/Arab%20League%20Ministerial%20level%20statement%2012%20march%20
2011%20-%20english.pdf, accessed 25 September 2014 
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the embattled monarchy crush protesters calling for democratic change. A ‘campaign of 
retribution’ followed as the foreign troops, primarily from Saudi Arabia, enabled the 
government to escalate its draconian crack-down.40 Despite this, Western states, the US in 
particular, criticised the violence ‘relatively mildly’ and supported the Crown-Prince’s 
promises to reform. The Bahrain Centre for Human Rights claimed that the desultory 
international response emboldened the Khalifa Monarchy; ‘the authorities in Bahrain, due to 
the lack of international consequences, have no incentive to stop the human rights 
violations’.41  
The selectivity has been more obvious, however, with respect to the situation in Syria. 
To date it is estimated that over 191,000 people have died while over 11 million people – 
more than half of Syria’s total population – have been displaced either internally or abroad.42 
There is no doubt it is overly simplistic to argue that the lack of military intervention in 
Syria43 constitutes definitive evidence that the intervention in Libya was thus motivated by 
oil, geopolitics etc. The situations are clearly different and the dynamics of Syria's 
relationship with key regional and international actors arguably militates against the kind of 
action taken against Libya. The charge of selectivity regarding Syria, however, should not 
focus only on Western states; while the US, UK and France have been denounced by many 
for failing to act robustly, the position of Russia, and to a lesser extent China, evidence a far 
more obviously inconsistent approach to abiding by R2P. Russia and China have four times 
vetoed resolutions on Syria yet in each case the draft resolutions sought only to impose 
 
40 International Crisis Group ‘Popular Protests in the Middle East and North Africa: Bahrain’s Rocky Road to 
Reform, Middle East/North Africa Report 111, 28 July, 2011, 4 
41 Bahrain Centre for Human Rights ‘No Peace No Progress, 2012, 7, www.bahrainrights.org, accessed 25 
August 2014 
42 N. Cumming-Bruce ‘Death Toll in Syria Estimated at 191,000’. The New York Times, August 22, 2014, 
www.nytimes.com/2014/08/23/world/middleeast/un-raises-estimate-of-dead-in-syrian-conflict-to-
191000.html?_r=0, accessed 25 August 2014 
43 In September 2014 the US led a bombing campaign against Islamic State (IS) militants in Iraq and Syria; 
while thus technically there has been a military intervention in Syria this was undertaken in response to the 
threat posed by IS rather than in response to the humanitarian crisis in Syria.  
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modest economic and political sanctions against Assad's regime and certainly did not suggest 
intervention. Indeed, beyond just blocking international attempts to censure Syria, Russia has 
continued to supply the regime with offensive weaponry.44  
This episode has troubling implications for R2P. Despite the various effusive 
declarations that it is a 'revolutionary' concept R2P has obviously not inhibited Russia from 
engaging in a very public display of cynical geopolitics and neither has it forestalled division 
at the UNSC. As the situation continued to deteriorate throughout 2012, on the 3rd August the 
General Assembly took the unusual step of condemning the UNSC in a non-binding 
resolution.45 In early August 2012 Kofi Annan stepped down as United Nations/League of 
Arab States Joint Special Envoy for the Syrian Crisis decrying the ‘finger-pointing and name-
calling in the Security Council’ which had impeded his efforts.46 The UNSC’s response to the 
crisis was neither timely nor decisive, and this arguably cost innumerable lives; in her final 
speech to the UNSC as UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay stated, 
‘greater responsiveness by this council would have saved hundreds of thousands of lives’.47 
The manner in which the UNSC dealt with Syria certainly deflated the optimism which 
followed the 2011 intervention in Libya; as Evans noted, ‘the shame and horror of Syria’ has 
led to ‘a real sense of disappointment’.48  
 Whether in the form of the Arab League's intervention in Bahrain, the West's 
shameful silence over this intervention, or Russia's policy of protecting Syria at the UN, the 
 
44 L. Harding ‘Syria's New Anti-aircraft Missiles Will Be Game-changing, Say Defence Analysts’, The 
Guardian, May 30, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/may/30/syria-anti-aircraft-missile-system, 
accessed on 24 January 2014. 
45 UN General Assembly, 124th Plenary Meeting, 3 August 2012, http://daccess-dds-
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2012, www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42609#.VBAkIvldWSo, accessed 25 August 2014 
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international response to the Arab Uprisings has alleviated the suffering of certain groups 
while ignoring the plight of others. Perversely, the power and international standing of 
NATO, the Arab League and Russia have arguably grown as a result of their various actions 
during the crises; each have at certain points shaped the "international" response to the 
dominant concern of the day. Where actors have had their designs thwarted - as surely even 
the US and Russia at various times have - this has been a result of old-fashioned power 
politics rather than the influence of R2P. Thus, like the sheriff, the P5 consolidate their power 
with each enforcement action whilst remaining outside of a judicial review process. Like the 
sheriff, the P5’s actions may be legal but they are of dubious legitimacy. 
As we noted above, not only is the problem of UNSC its selectivity, but there is also a 
strong punitive dimension to the way in which R2P has been invoked in the context of UNSC 
action. Indeed, it is not simply that the UNSC makes R2P more punitive, but that R2P itself 
as it is currently constituted, includes a punitive dimension. This means that invocations of 
the norm around debates about intervention soon become debates about punishing 
wrongdoers. In the case of the international community’s response to the Arab Uprisings, we 
see this in both the intervention that did take place (Libya) and the one in which it did not 
(Syria). 
A year after the intervention in Libya Benjamin Freidman wrote: 
One [reason to intervene] was to show other dictators that the international 
community would not tolerate the violent suppression of dissenters. That reverse 
domino theory has obviously failed. If Qaddafi’s fate taught neighbouring leaders 
like Bashar al-Assad anything, it is to brutally nip opposition movements in the 
bud before they coalesce, attract foreign arms and air support, and kill you—or, if 
you’re lucky, ship you off to the Hague.49 
 
 
49 B. H. Friedman, ‘Intervention in Libya and Syria isn’t Humanitarian or Liberal’ The National Interest, 5 April 
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It seems evident that the intervention in Libya included both deterrent and retributive 
dimensions. Unlike others, though, this intervention targeted primarily the leadership, not just 
Qaddafi but members of his family.  
UNSC Resolution 1973 was largely punitive; its operational clauses included five 
elements: 1) a deferral of the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court (ICC); 2) 
an arms embargo; 3) a travel ban for those within the regime; 4) the freezing of assets of 
those in the regime; and 5) the creation of a sanctions committee to monitor compliance with 
the resolution. Of these five, only one, the arms embargo, was not explicitly punitive. The 
others all targeted the regime and the leadership of Libya. The intervention was hailed by 
supporters for both stopping atrocities and deferring future ones: “Fulfilling the responsibility 
to protect involves identifying the scenarios whereby civilians may be the victims of mass 
atrocities, adopting strategies to deter perpetrators from committing future crimes, and 
crucially, employing protective strategies to halt current attacks”.50  A subsequent statement 
from the same organization, again calling for intervention, implied more clearly a punitive 
logic: “Behind the firm voice of the Arab League and its support for more forceful action lies 
the conviction that the Libyan regime should face the consequences for its brutal actions”.51 
Resolution 1973 set out the important operational clause of allowing ‘all means 
necessary’ for three objectives: 1) protect civilians; 2) create a no-fly zone; and 3) enforce the 
arms embargo. But as became clear soon after military operations began, the mission of 
protecting civilians means not simply stopping harms against them but hurting those that are 
doing the harming; in other words, inflicting harm for violating a rule, the definition of 
 
50 Open Letter to the UNSC from the International Coalition on R2P and the Global Centre for the 
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punishment noted above. In a press conference on 8 April 2011, the deputy commander of the 
mission hinted at the punitive logic underling the means of protecting civilians: 
On Wednesday, we engaged forces in central Libya including an air defence 
facility near Surt under our mission to protect civilians and civilian population 
areas. The pressure of NATO aircraft and the accuracy of our strikes continue to 
pressure those who would bring harm to innocent civilians.52 
 
On 27 June 2011, the ICC issued arrest warrants for three individuals charged with crimes 
against humanity: Muammar Gaddafi, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, and Abdullah al-Sanussi.53 The 
indictment - designed to support the rebels against the Gaddafi regime54 - relied primarily on 
events that took place in February 2011 surrounding the use of military force against 
protestors. When, the ICC’s arrest warrants were issued, NATO’s spokesperson stated: 
The arrest warrants are yet another signal from the international community to the 
Qadhafi regime. Your place is on trial; not in power, in Tripoli. It is not for 
NATO to enforce that warrant. That is for the appropriate authorities…we have 
made clear from the start that there is no purely military solution. It's the 
combination of our continued military pressure and a reinforced political pressure 
that will bring about the transition to democracy that the Libyan people demand 
and deserve.55 
Note the spokesperson affirms that the arrest warrants are part of the same strategy as the 
military campaign, yet makes it clear that the military campaign is not about arresting 
individuals. The idea that the intervention and the ICC could work in parallel had been part of 
the larger intervention; as US Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates stated at a press conference 
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in Cairo, ‘the international community has a number of ‘hammers in its toolbox’, one of 
which is the ICC’.56 
On 20 October 2011 Qaddafi was killed by rebel soldiers. Only two days later, the 
NATO Secretary General announced the ‘liberation of Libya’. While NATO had insisted on 
keeping itself separate from the ICC indictment and tried to keep its focus on protection of 
civilians rather than punishment, the fact that the intervention ended almost as soon as 
Qaddafi was killed suggests that his death – or punishment of sorts – fulfilled their mission. 
The wider discourse of the intervention and the fact that the intervention ended after the death 
of Qaddafi points to the overarching punitive nature of the intervention, especially when 
coupled with ICC indictment. While the case against Qaddafi’s son and al-Sanussi continues, 
the punitive element of the intervention itself seems clear here.  
While there has not been an intervention against Assad’s forces in Syria, the 
arguments being made in support of intervention parallel the punitive logic of the Libyan 
intervention. The US government’s initial response to Assad’s use of chemical weapons 
called for accountability in language stronger than most diplomatic statements; Secretary of 
State John Kerry argued in his press conference of 26 August 2013 that “…there is 
accountability for the use of chemical weapons so that it never happens again…President 
Obama believes there must be accountability for those who would use the world's most 
heinous weapons against the world's most vulnerable people.”57 While accountability is not 
necessarily the same as punishment, the primary means of holding agents accountable in a 
political system is by punishing those who violate the rules. Further, in the case of Syria, it 
 
56 News Transcript, Department of Defence, 23 March 2011, Cairo Egypt, 
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would appear that the threat of punishment may have prompted the regime to respond, as it 
soon decided to turn over its chemical weapons materials to the international community.  
In response to the call for a punitive intervention in Syria, some international legal 
scholars have emphasized the illegality of punishment or the related ideas of reprisals and 
countermeasures in the current international legal order. One analyst, echoing the analysis 
here, though taking a directly opposed position, argued that punitive intervention violates the 
primary legal structure concerning the use of force, the UN Charter. 58  
A different account, also from an international legal position, argues that the current 
international legal order does not allow for the idea of state crime and so it cannot support the 
idea of punitive intervention.59 Both these accounts suggest that non-lethal modes of 
intervention would be preferred to punitive intervention. In the case of Syria, though, it is 
difficult to see what this would mean. As suggested by the fact that the regime dropped its 
chemical weapons programme in part because of the pressures placed on it by the Obama 
administration, perhaps one can conclude that the deterrent threat of punishment 
accomplished some good.  
 In addition to the deterrent nature of a possible punitive intervention, there are also 
suggestions for a retributive one. In August 2011 the UN Human Rights Council established 
an Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic with a 
mandate to ‘identify those responsible with a view of ensuring that perpetrators of violations, 
including those that may constitute crimes against humanity, are held accountable.’60 Navi 
Pillay, stated in December 2013 that the Commission’s findings made it clear that the regime 
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would be held accountable and that she believed members should be tried before the ICC.61 
In January 2013, Switzerland proposed that the UNSC should refer the case of Syria to the 
ICC in a letter signed by both the United Kingdom and France. Philippe Sands argued that 
the proposal to try members of the regime before the ICC is a “justified gamble”.62 Though 
not interventions, these developments suggest that a wider discourse of retributive 
punishment surrounds and informs the international response to Syria.  
 
Reform 
Both R2P and the ICC emerged during a period when there were widespread calls for reform 
of the UN; NATO's unilateral intervention in Kosovo in 1999, coupled with the fallout from 
the Rwandan genocide, had created a consensus, albeit heterogeneous, in favour of reform, 
particularly of the UNSC. Yet the ICISS did not substantively address the very issue that 
arguably impelled its formation, namely the question of authority.63 Thus, arguably the most 
concerted effort in the modern era aimed at reforming the manner in which the international 
community responds to intra-state crises, culminated in literally no alteration to the existing 
discredited legal and political system. Likewise, while the ICC was initially lauded as major 
step forward for international law and the punishment of human rights violators, the court’s 
functioning and capacity continue to be impeded by the constitutional competencies afforded 
to the UNSC.  
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Not reforming the UNSC has a number of negative consequences. First, as the 
reaction of the "international community" to a particular crisis remains in essence dependant 
on the disposition of the UNSC, the key factor in determining how violations of human rights 
are addressed and/or punished remains the political will of the P5. Thus, perpetrators of 
systematic human rights abuses can shield themselves from external censure if they have 
cultivated an alliance with one of the veto-wielding P5. Despite the emergence of R2P and 
the ICC, therefore, certain oppressive regimes have continued to focus on cultivating an 
alliance with a member of the P5 rather than change their illegal behaviour. In any system 
where legal censure is not guaranteed – either because of the judiciary’s ineffectiveness, lack 
of coercive capacity or its susceptibility to corruption and/or the influence of power – 
potential law breakers are naturally less wary of breaking the law. 64  
 Another adverse consequence is that the UNSC and the ICC continue to stand accused 
of impotence and/or hypocrisy. Various commentators have derided the UNSC and the ICC 
for their failure to act against Assad in Syria.65 Their capacity to act, however, has been 
hamstrung by their respective constitutional competencies which inhibit their capacity for 
independent action; as discussed earlier, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
published a report in late 2013 suggesting that the Assad regime’s tactics amounted to war 
crimes which could come under the purview of the ICC. Yet, the next stage – 
enforcement/punishment – was stalled because it was a matter for the P5 to determine how to 
respond.66 Additionally, when either organisation has acted they have been criticised for 
engaging in hypocritical realpolitik, and being handmaidens to power.  While the UN and the 
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ICC are both imperfect institutions, erosion of support for these primary bastions of 
international law, multilateralism and universal jurisprudence undoubtedly constitutes a set-
back for those who support the evolution of a world order which places a primary emphasis 
on the protection of individual human rights.    
We consider the status quo untenable and reform essential. The problem is certainly 
not the absence of laws proscribing human rights violations – there are few areas not covered 
by international law67 – nor is there a problem with respects to either the principle of 
international censure or a lack of an international judicial body. The primary problem, as 
outlined in earlier sections, is the process by which human rights laws are upheld and 
violators punished.68 The problem can thus be located primarily at the point of enforcement; 
thus the requisite reform need not require a complete transformation of the present legal 
order. The starting point would be to build on the provisions related to R2P in the 2005 
World Summit Outcome Document and the vast corpus of human rights law and consolidate 
these into a legally binding treaty which reiterates the proscription against various forms of 
human rights abuses and, crucially, outlines both the point at which these abuses are to be 
considered so severe as to warrant external involvement of some kind – though not 
necessarily military intervention – and the manner in which this decision would be taken, by 
whom and through which legal processes. These processes would, we feel, necessitate the 
establishment of an independent and accountable judicial body with the power to determine 
both that a violation of the law has occurred and the nature of the resultant punishment. The 
nature of the punishment, would of course, potentially vary -as is the case with respects to 
judicial decisions domestically - and allow for judicial decisions which reflect the reality that 
in certain contexts particular types of punitive action – most obviously military intervention – 
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would potentially do more harm than good. Through the imposition of alternative measures – 
including sanctions, suspension of UN membership, travel bans and ICC referrals – violators 
would incur punishment of some form. Additionally, and crucially, the very availability of 
these punitive sanctions, would serve as a deterrent.  
This judicial body could also, we contend, come into being without necessitating the 
dissolution of the UNSC; conceivably it could be triggered into action in situations where the 
UNSC is demonstrably deadlocked despite consensus in the General Assembly in favour of 
punitive action, as was very obviously the case with respects to Syria. The new body would, 
therefore, challenge the UNSC’s ‘unconditional exclusive legitimacy’ rather than its 
legitimacy per se.69 A further consideration would be the establishment of a military force 
within the UN at the disposal of the new body mandated to undertake coercive action should 
states be unwilling to deploy their troops. Such a force would be used only in very rare cases; 
there would need to be an atrocity of a grave magnitude, no alternative diplomatic means, 
deadlock at the UNSC and the unavailability of member state forces. The number of cases 
where this could happen would be, we feel, very small. Nonetheless, such a force – which has 
long been suggested – would potentially redress the unedifying spectacle of inertia in the face 
of egregious human suffering and its very existence would act as a deterrent in itself. 
The goal avowed here can of course be criticized, not unreasonably, as utopian. That 
said, we offer the following rejoinders; first, the primary aim here is to demonstrate that the 
existing system – even post R2P and the ICC – remains fundamentally corrupted by the 
constitutional competencies of the UNSC, specifically the P5. Achieving agreement around 
this claim would constitute progress as it would hopefully impel those concerned about 
human rights to desist from engaging with strategies which, we feel, are doomed to fail, and 
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instead work on determining how the reforms we advance in general terms might be 
implemented in practice. Additionally, the temper of the international community is 
demonstrably in favour of reform; the UNSC is widely acknowledged as lacking legitimacy 
in terms of its membership and competencies as reflected in the statements from the General 
Assembly, the UN Secretary-General and the general trend amount commentators and 
academics. Our call for reform is not, therefore, an aberration, but rather reflective of many 
voices in the international community. The international system is, famously, very different 
from the domestic legal system and thus the institutional configuration and theoretical 
foundations – normative and real – of domestic legal orders naturally do not equate with that 
which exists internationally; yet to assert this as a counter to those, like us, who advocate 
legal reform is somewhat paradoxical as it suggests that the normative systemic configuration 
cannot be achieved because it does not presently exist. We are certainly not alone in 
suggesting alternative means of improving the international response to intra-state crises and 
the commission of mass atrocities; as Susan Meyer argued, ‘...without major changes in the 
UN, R2P will go the way of the Genocide Convention’.70   
 
Conclusion 
R2P as understood by some of its defenders and as framed in some UNSC resolutions 
conflates the punitive and law enforcement functions. When the UNSC engages in actions 
that conflate law enforcement, protection, and punishment, it might contribute to a peaceful 
resolution in a particular case, but in the longer term such actions reconstitute the legal and 
political order in such a way that the UNSC’s powers grow unchecked. So, while we agree 
that there must be some role for the UNSC in the maintenance of international peace and 
 
70 S. Meyer, ‘In Our Interest: The Responsibility to Protect’, in Cooper and Kohler (n 15), 56. See also 
Buchanan and Keohane, (n. 69);  Hurrell, (n. 64), 30; J. Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention and the 
Responsibility to Protect (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 
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security, we also believe that this role must be part of a better defined legal and political order 
with a strengthened judicial structure, organized around both the ICC and the ICJ.  
Many hold that R2P has increased the chances that the UNSC will act and that this 
constitutes progress when compared with bygone eras when - ostensibly - there was 
consistently no response.71 It is our contention, however, that R2P entrenches the very 
structural problems that have contrived to produce the poor record advocates of R2P sought 
to redress. At present R2P facilitates a world order in which certain agents – specifically the 
P5 – can selectively increase their own power and still fail to uphold the protection of 
individuals. This deleterious selectivity was readily apparent during the UNSC's response to 
the Arab Uprisings particularly with respect to the situations in Libya, Bahrain and Syria.  
 A fundamental principle underpinning any legal order is the removal of selectivity 
from law enforcement and to that end the constitutional separation of the judiciary from the 
executive lest we have the sheriff-like scenario whereby the three different functions of law 
in a political order - legislation, judgment and enforcement - are conflated in one agent. At 
present – even post R2P – the international legal system comprises just such a constitutional 
conflation; the UNSC thus operates as a ‘political core in a legal regime’.72 So long as this 
remains the case, the enforcement of international law will be compromised. While R2P and 
the ICC certainly constitute progressive developments, there remains, what Anne Peters 
terms, a ‘missing link’ which is precisely the gap between law and enforcement.73  
We readily acknowledge that the proposals we advance are not necessarily going to 
be adopted in the near future. But, we do see these as an improvement on the current calls for 
strengthening R2P which fail to take into account this longer-term political and legal critique. 
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We find the idea that we must submit to the status quo because reform is unrealistic74 
unconvincing; that the international and domestic are very different legal orders is axiomatic; 
that they should - and will always - be so is fatalistic and, in essence, unhelpful. There have 
been myriad proposals advanced which advocate reform of the international legal system75 – 
and the powers of the UNSC in particular – all of which essentially cohere with Hans 
Kelsen’s conception of the current system as ‘primitive’ and but a stage in an evolutionary 
process’.76 Our contribution has not been to provide a detailed proposal but rather to argue, 
on the basis of the fate of R2P and the ICC during the Arab Uprisings, that those concerned 
with human rights protection must accept that any proposals which seek to redress the 
appalling record of international responses to intra-state crises will fail if they do not aim to 
reform the current legal system.  
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